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COMMENTS
SHEPPARD v. MAXWELL:
FREE SPEECH AND PRESS v. FAIR TRIAL
In an era of highly competitive journalism, increased effort is
exerted by newspapers, magazines, radio, and television to capture the
attention and patronage of the reader or listener. To achieve this end,
sensational, incomplete, biased, and often inaccurate materials pertain-
ing to the commission of crimes, the search for the perpetrator, his
arrest, the ensuing pretrial activity, and, finally, the trial itself is some-
times disseminated.
With such overwhelming and increasing opportunity for persons to
become acquainted with the many details of the events and personalities
involved, the subsequent selection of jurors not already too familiar
with what has supposedly occurred becomes difficult and sometimes
nearly impossible.
Early in the ninteenth century it was recognized:
[W] ere it possible to obtain a jury without any prepossessions what-
ever respecting the guilt or innocence of the accused, it would be
extremely desirable to obtain such a jury, but this is perhaps impos-
sible, and therefore will not be required.'
With the great technological advances in the communications field
since Mr. Chief Justice Marshall made this observation, the problems
have multiplied and the chances of selecting a panel from persons
without prepossessions are lessened.
Once the jury is selected and sworn, the dangers of extra-judicial
influences do not cease. Publicity during and about the trial including
television intrusion in the courtroom may preclude a fair hearing and
a verdict based solely on evidence admissible in a court of law, properly
considered by a jury with opportunity for calm deliberation.
Many of the fundamental problems were brought into sharp focus
and rather precise solutions were suggested when the United States
Supreme Court ordered the reversal of the denial of a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus to Dr. Samuel Sheppard in Sbeppard v. Maxwell.2
1. U.S. v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 49, 50-51 (No. 14962g) (C.C.E.D. Va. 1807). (Mr. Chief
Justice John Marshall's opinion for the Court).
2. 86 S. Ct. 1507 (1966).
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The decision marked the passing of a milestone in the lengthy legal
battle of the Ohio physician convicted in 1954 of the slaying of his
wife.3 The Court, in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Clark, re-
counted in detail the events which occurred from the murder until Dr.
Sheppard's conviction about six months later. 4
During the period from the killing, July 4, until petitioner was ar-
rested, July 30, the Cleveland press ran numerous highly prejudicial
news stories and much editorial comment calling for his arrest.
The immediate pretrial and trial period was replete with actions and
incidents prejudicial to Sheppard including publication of names and
addresses of the veniremen more than three weeks before trial, over-
whelming presence of representatives of the news media in the court-
room and courthouse resulting in confusion and deprivation of privacy
of the principals in the trial, and continuing and penetrating newspaper
and radio commentary during the trial.5
The Court concluded that the trial judge's failure to protect Shep-
pard from inherently prejudicial publicity which saturated the com-
munity and to control disruptive influences in the courtroom consti-
tuted a denial of due process of law. With the intention of reducing
such prejudicial interference in the future, certain guidelines were set
forward.6
This case further manifests the Court's recognition that publicity
may be of such an inflammatory and a pervasive nature that it is in-
herently prejudicial to the accused. By accepting this premise, a de-
fendant may obtain a reversal because he has been denied due process
as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment without showing specific
instances of isolatable prejudice.
While state and federal criminal procedures provide certain safeguards
to counterbalance pervasive and prejudicial pretrial and trial publicity,7
3. The petitioner was convicted of second degree murder, the conviction being
affirmed by the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County, 100 Ohio App. 345, 128 N.E.
2d 471 (1955), and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed, 165 Ohio State 293, 135 N.E. 2d
340 (1956). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, 352 U.S. 955 (1956).
Subsequently, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied by the Ohio Supreme
Court, 170 Ohio State 551, 167 N.E. 2d 94 (1960). In 1964, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, granted a writ of habeas
corpus, 231 F. Supp. 37 (1964), but the order was reversed, 346 F. 2d 707 (1965), and
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, 382 U.S. 916 (1965).
4. Supra note 2 at 1509-1515.
5. Id. at 1512-1513.
6. See notes 43-46, infra, and accompanying text.
7. E.g., change of venue, continuance, voir dire examination of jurors with challenges
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the accused has normally been required to demonstrate more than po-
tential prejudice in order to invoke the safeguards.
As Mr. Justice Holmes cautioned:
If the mere opportunity for prejudice or corruption is to raise a
presumption that they exist, it will be hard to maintain jury trial under
the conditions of the present day.8
In the Supreme Court, the requirement was articulated in 1942 and
has been reiterated with regularity, at least until recently.
[I]t is not asking too much that the burden of showing essential un-
fairness be sustained by him who claims such injustice and seeks to
have the result set aside and that it be sustained not as a matter of
speculation, but as a demonstrable reality.9
The United States Constitution guarantees the accused the right to
have his case decided by an impartial jury in the federal courts.'0 The
words "impartial jury" appear in the constitutions of forty states," and
can be implied from the guarantee of trial by jury in the others.' 2 The
selection of such an impartial jury is another matter.
An early expression of the idea that publicity had prevented the selec-
for cause and limited peremptory challenges, trial instructions by judge to jurors to
avoid extra-judicial familiarization with materials related to the case, sequestration of
jury, mistrial, and new trial. See Mueller, Problems Posed by Publicity to Crime and
Criminal Proceedings, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 12 (1961).
8. Holt v. U.S., 218 U.S. 249, 251 (1879).
9. Adams v. U.S. ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 281 (1942); accord, Buchalter v.
N.Y, 319 U.S. 427, 431 (1943); U.S. ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 351 U.S. 454, 462 (1956).
10. U. S. CoNsr. amend. VI.
11. ALASKA CoNsr. art. I, § 13; Aaiz. CoNsr. art. II, § 24; ARK. CoNSr. art. II, § 10;
C6Lo. CoNsT. art. II, § 16; DEr. CoNsr. art. I, S 7; FiA. CONST. Declar. of Rights, § 11;
GA. CONsT. art. I, § 15; HAWAII CONsr. art. , § 11; Iu. CONST. art. II, § 9; IND. CONST.
art. , § 13; IowA CONST. art. I, § 10; KAN. CoNsr. Bill of Rights, § 10; KY. CONST. § 11;
Ma. CoNsr. art. I, § 6; MD. CONST. Declar. of Rights, § 21; MicH. CONsr. art. II, § 19;
MINN. CONST. art. , § 6; Miss. CoNsr. art. III, § 26; Mo. CoNsr. art. I, § 18a; Morr.
CONST. art. III, § 16; LA. CoNsr. art. , § 9; NEB. CoNsr. art. I, § 11; NJ. CoNsr. art. I,§ 10; N.M. CoNsr. art. II, § 14; OHIO CoNsr art. I, § 10; OKLA. CoNsr. art. II, § 20; ORE.
CONSr. art. I, § 11; PA. CoNsT. art. 1, § 9; R.I. CoNsr. art. I, § 10; S.C. CoNsr. art. 1, § 18;
S.D. CONsr. art VI, § 7; Tax. CowsT. art. I, § 10; TENN. CONST. art. L § 9; UTAH CoNsr.
art. , § 12; VT. CONSr. art. 1, § 10; VA. CONST. art. , § 8; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22;
Wyo. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
12. See generally, State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841 (1964). See also
Note, Community Hostility and the Right to an Impartial Jury, 60 COLUM. L. Rav. 349
(1960).
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don of an impartial jury came in Shepherd v. Florida.3 While a
state court murder conviction was reversed per curiam on the grounds
of racial discrimination in the selection of the jury, Mr. Justice Jackson,
in a concurring opinion, indicated he felt pretrial publicity had done
more to prejudice the accused and to deprive him of his rights. 4
In this case witnesses and jurors admitted either having heard of or
read an alleged confession of the Negro defendants charged with raping
a white girl. The confession was never produced in court.
The concurring opinion noted the desirability of the trial judge con-
trolling press interference with the judicial process. 15 An indictment
of newspapers for out-of-court campaigns to convict seemed to augur
subsequent decisions. The constitutional rights of newspapers do not
include the right to deprive an accused person of a fair trial. Press
activity may cause a conviction to transcend any civilized conception
of due process of law, thus warranting reversal.' 6
A short time later the Court showed it was not actively seeking a first
opportunity to reverse a conviction because of prejudicial publicity
without adequate ground work being laid in the trial court. In Stroble
v. California,'7 after noting that no motion for a change of venue had
been made nor had any evidence been offered to show prejudice in fact
by any juror, the Court said:
He asks this Court simply to read those stories and then to declare,
over the contrary finding of two state courts, that they necessarily
deprived him of due process. That we cannot do at least where, as
here, the inflammatory newspaper accounts appeared approximately six
weeks before the beginning of petitioner's trial, and there is no affirma-
tive showing that any community prejudice ever existed or in any way
affected the deliberation of the jury.'8 [Emphasis supplied.]
A significant developmental decision was rendered in 1959 when the
Supreme Court exercised its supervisory power over the federal court
13. 341 U.S. 50 (1951).
14. He stated:
To me, the technical question of discrimination in the jury selection has only
theoretical importance. The case presents one of the best examples of one of the
worst menaces to American justice. Id. at 55.
15. Cf., Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331
(1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
16. Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 53 (1951) (concurring opinion).
17. 343 U.S. 181 (1952).
18. Id. at 195.
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system by granting a new trial to a federal defendant because some of
the jurors had read of the accused's previous criminal convictions.19
The Court, acknowledging the trial judge's large discretion,20 con-
cluded that each case must turn on its special facts. It recognized that
evidence not admissible in court but reaching the jury by extralegal
processes may have a great impact.
An important decision holding prejudicial publicity sufficient to in-
fect the geographical area so that an impartial jury was not selected was
rendered in 1961.21 Here, petitioner, who had been unsuccessful in an
attempt to obtain direct review by the Supreme Court, sought a writ of
habeas corpus.
Six murders in the area of Evansville, Indiana had the population in
a frenzy. Shortly after petitioner was arrested, police officials began
to release statements, the most damaging of which was that petitioner
had confessed. Later at trial only a single change of venue to an ad-
joining county was granted. During voir dire further motions for
change of venue and motions for continuances were made but denied.
The Supreme Court restated the general rule concerning the pre-
su.mption of impartiality of jurors and the burden on the accused of
showing actual prejudice resulting from publicity. After reviewing the
publicity surrounding the arrest and subsequent events, the Court de-
termined that the build-up of prejudice was clear and convincing.22
A large percentage of the veniremen had to be excused because of
their preconceived notions of the guilt of the accused derived from what
they had read and heard. Of the twelve jurors finally selected, eight
admitted feeling to some degree that the petitioner was guilty before
they heard any evidence.
The Court decided that in a capital case, such as the one at bar,
taking into account the frailties of human nature, the circumstances
prevented the trial court's finding of impartiality from meeting a con-
stitutional standard.23
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter offered a scathing
criticism of irresponsible journalism by questioning:
19. Marshall v. U. S., 360 U.S. 310 (1959) (per curiam).
,.20. The trial judge had examined the jurors, seven of whom admitted reading the
article, but indicated they felt no prejudice toward the defendant. The trial judge
denied a motion for a mistrial.
21. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
22. Id. at 725.
23. Id. at 727, 728.
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How can fallible men and women reach a disinterested verdict based
exclusively on what they heard in court when, before they entered
the jury box, their minds were saturated by press and radio for months
preceding by matter designed to establish the guilt of the accused. A
conviction so secured obviously constitutes a denial of due process of
law in its most rudimentary conception.24
A major breakthrough for those who argued that publicity may be
so inherently prejudicial to an accused that it infects the jury precluding
the possibility of a fair hearing came in the first of the three major
decisions25 in this area of the law. The Supreme Court, on direct review,
reversed a Louisiana state conviction because a filmed "interview,"
wherein the accused made admissions of his guilt, was repeatedly shown
on a local television station.26
Rideau v. Louisiana is a case showing the insidious effects of television
when it saturates the community with publicity prejudicial to the ac-
cused. The twenty minute filmed episode photographed in the jail
with Rideau flanked by police officers permitted hundreds of potential
jurors in the case to hear and see him admit to a bank robbery, a kidnap-
ping, and a murder.
The Court held that Rideau was denied due process when the trial
court refused to grant a change of venue after the television publicity.
Without examining a particularized transcript of the voir dire examina-
tion of the members of the jury, the Court held that due process in this
case required a trial before a jury drawn from a community of people
who had not seen and heard Rideau's televised "interview." 27
Even under the extreme circumstances presented by the facts of the
case, Mr. Justice Clark dissented, arguing that no substantial nexus be-
tween the "interview" and the trial was shown. While characterizing
the circumstances of Irvin v. Dowd,28 as unusually compelling, the dis-
sent felt the burden of showing essential unfairness had not been met
by the petitioner.29
Although most of the problems relating to pretrial and trial publicity
deal with descriptions of the events and personalities involved, a slightly
24. Id. at 729, 730.
25. Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra note 2; Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Rideau
v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
26. Rideau v. Louisiana, supra note 25.
27. Id. at 727.
28. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
29. 373 U.S. 725, 733 (dissenting opinion).
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different situation was presented in Estes v. Texas,30 where the petitioner
contended that televising and broadcasting his trial amounted to a denial
of due process.
Estes, charged in a celebrated case with swindling, had obtained a
change of venue because of the notoriety of the events. At a hearing on
a motion to prevent live broadcasting of his trial and for a continuance,
live radio and television coverage was permitted. During the actual trial,
live broadcasts were limited; but television filming cameras, at least, were
always present.31
The Supreme Court strongly rejected the contention by the state of
Texas that isolatable prejudice traceable to the publicity must be shown
in any case. Relying on Rideau32 and Turner v. Louisiana,13 the Court
found the use of television in this case inherently prejudicial, without a
careful scrutiny of all the factual elements.3 4 Mr. Justice Clark, writing
for the majority, enumerated some of the specific objections to tele-
vising the proceedings:
1. The potential impact of television on the jurors.35
2. The impairment of the quality of testimony.3 6
3. The additional responsibility placed on the trial judge. 7
4. The impact on the defendant.38
The full precedent value and significance of the decision must await
other decisions about television in the courtroom because Mr. Justice
Harlan, voting with the majority of five favoring reversal,3 9 concurred
only to a limited extent.4°
30. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
31. See id. at 537-538 for a description of the procedure followed.
32. Rideau v. Louisiana, supra note 25.
33. 379 U.S. 466 (1965) (deputy sheriffs who were witnesses in the case also served
as shepherds for the jury).
34. Compare Irvin v. Dowd, supra note 21.
35. Estes v. Texas, supra note 25 at 545-547.
36. Id. at 547, 548.
37. Id. at 548, 549.
38. id. at 549, 550.
39. Clark, Warren, Douglas, Goldberg, and Harlan to the extent set forth in his
concurring opinion, see supra note 25 at 587-601, for reversal. Sewart, Black, Brennan,
and White dissenting.
40. He phrased the question presented:
(W)hether the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State, over the objection of
defendant, from employing television in the courtroom to televise contemporane-
ously or subsequently by means of video tape, the courtroom proceedings of a
criminal trial of widespread public interest.
He then concluded:
1966]
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Sheppard v. Maxwell,41 did not involve any actual telecasting or
broadcasting from within the courtroom, but the appellate courts had
to contend with diverse materials and events either directly or inferen-
tially prejudicial to the petitioner. Included was the unfavorable radio,
television, and newspaper commentary, the trial judge's refusal to grant
motions for a change of venue, continuances, a mistrial, and his refusal
to interrogate the jurors about their exposure to publicity during the
trial, the press occupation of areas of the courtroom normally reserved
for the principals, and a general confusion existent during the entire
proceeding.
Again acknowledging the basic requirement of a showing of identifi-
able prejudice by the accused, the Court held that at times the state pro-
cedure involves such a probability that prejudice will result that it is
deemed inherently lacking in due process."
During the trial, the carnival atmosphere could have been avoided
since the courtroom and courthouse are subject to the control of the
court.48  The witnesses should have been insulated from the press.44
Also, the court should have made some effort to control the release of
leads, information and gossip to the press by the police witnesses and
counsel for both sides.45
When pretrial publicity creates reasonable likelihood that a fair trial
will be presented, the judge should grant a continuance or transfer the
trial to another locality where the threat is reduced. 6
While again in Sheppard an extreme and deplorable situation was
presented to the Court, it seems clear that a long look will be taken at
the totality of the situation. If a reasonable conclusion is that a proba-
bility of prejudice exists, some severe remedial steps should be taken at
the trial level or they will be taken by the reviewing court.
(There) is no constitutional requirement that television be allowed in the court-
room, and, at least, as to notorious criminal trials such as this one, the considera-
tions against allowing television in the courtroom so far outweigh the counter-
vailing factors advanced in its support as to require a holding that what was
done in this case infringed the fundamental right to a fair trial assured by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Estes v. Texas, supra note
25 at 587.
41. 86 S. Ct. 1507 (1966).
42. Id. at 1517; accord, Estes v. Texas, supra note 25 at 542-543.
43. Id. at 1520.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Supra note 41 at 1522.
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The significance of the case lies in the fact that even though no con-
fession was involved and even though the death penalty had not been
imposed and even though no broadcasting was allowable from the court-
room, the Court took another step and let the courts and press know
that interference and lack of control could deny due process.
Lloyd Sullenberger
